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The Field Artillery Revolution and the European Military Balance, 1890-1914  
 
This article analyses the origins and Europe-wide impact of France’s Canon de 75mm Modèle 
1897 (75mm model 1897 cannon). A beacon of Gallic engineering prowess, it has been 
considered the first modern field gun.
1
 It became the standard field weapon not only of the 
French artillery but also of the 1917-18 American Expeditionary Force. In 1939 hundreds 
remained in service. Through a complex of changes – most notably a mechanism enabling the 
barrel to regain position after recoil while the carriage remained static – the 75mm fired much 
faster than its predecessors, and better protected its crew.
2
 It impelled the other Powers to 
follow France’s example, straining both their public finances and their manufacturing 
capacity, and disrupting the balance between the Continental armies. Developed and 
deployed in secret, it established French superiority over Germany for a decade. In the final 
pre-war years, however, France’s lead eroded, and the 75mm’s very success arguably became 
an impediment. Its history therefore illuminates the wider roles of technological innovation, 
domestic political pressures, and geopolitical rivalries in the pre-First World War land arms 
race, as well as the connections between that arms race and the breakdown of peace. Whereas 
in 1905 France’s artillery advantage helped deter a German onslaught, by 1914 France’s 
vulnerability helped encourage its neighbour to strike.   
 
The 75mm built on decades of innovation. During the nineteenth century cone-nosed shells 
replaced spherical shot, artillery barrels were rifled (imparting a spin to increase range and 
accuracy), breech-loading replaced muzzle-loading, and steel replaced bronze. From the 
1880s modern explosives supplanted gunpowder: both ‘low’ explosives as a propellant 
(driving the projectile from the barrel) and high explosives as the charge. Guns fired further, 
higher, and faster, without the smoke that had previously impeded visibility (though also 
assisted concealment). Yet simultaneously new and longer-range magazine rifles made 
gunners more vulnerable to sharpshooters. Moreover, the new explosives exacerbated recoil - 
the gun jolting backwards after firing and needing to be re-aimed - and ‘jump’ - if its wheels 
were locked, it bucked. Fortress, coastal, and warship guns were fitted with devices to 
counter recoil, but the equipment was heavy and cumbersome, and fitting it to mobile field 
artillery proved difficult.
3
 Absorbing recoil was everywhere acknowledged as the biggest 
obstacle to enhanced performance, but it was in France where the breakthrough to achieving 
it occurred.
4
    
Much of the documentation on the 75mm was destroyed in 1940 by bombing.
5
 Nonetheless, 
the weapon’s origins are traced in inter-war accounts. The gestation process centred on the 
War Ministry’s workshops and testing grounds and was overseen by the ministry’s Artillery 
Direction in conjunction with the President of the (advisory) Artillery Technical Committee 
and successive ministers.
6
 Since the Franco-Prussian War the standard French field artillery 
piece had been the de Bange 90mm 1877. Typically it recoiled by one to two metres and fired 
just one round every five minutes;
7
 moreover by the 1890s the de Banges were wearing out. 
Even so, the 75mm story began unexpectedly, when military intelligence alerted the Artillery 
Direction to a patent registered by a German engineer, Konrad Haussner. Haussner had 
worked on his design during his own time while employed by the Prussian state arsenal and 
then by Germany’s biggest private arms firm, Krupp. His key insight, in a memorandum to 
his Krupp overseers, was that a longer recoil would facilitate hydraulic braking and push-
back. His superiors doubted the practicability, and resented a young man trying to teach them 
their trade.
8
 Undeterred, Haussner protected his design by German and French patents. He 
neglected, however, to pay the fees required to uphold the latter, which in January 1892 
reached the French Artillery Director, General Charles Mathieu.
9
 They showed the Germans 
were working on the problem, and they adumbrated a solution.  
The significance of the Haussner designs’ contribution has been questioned; and they would 
be much amended.
10
 Still, they suggested a new approach when work on a short-recoil 
mechanism had reached an impasse.
11
 Hence Mathieu consulted the Artillery Technical 
Committee and developed specifications for a recoil-absorbing 75mm gun. The committee’s 
president approached the War Ministry’s artillery workshop at Puteaux, whose director, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph-Albert Deport, thought he could produce a workable device:
12
 in 
May 1894 six of the resulting prototypes were ordered. Although they could already fire up to 
twenty-two rounds per minute without budging - more than satisfying the initial specification 
- the hydro-pneumatic brake was far from perfect and the piston fluid leaked. At this point 
Deport, disgruntled at receiving no promotion, left for a private arms firm and the project 
passed over to Captain Charles-Etienne Sainte-Claire Deville, soon assisted by Captain Emile 
Rimailho, both (like Deport) graduates of the army’s elite engineering school, the Ecole 
polytechnique. They designed an entirely new brake (whose details they withheld even from 
the Artillery Committee)
13
 which formed the centrepiece of a complete new weapons system 
of guns, caissons, and shells.
14
 The authorities feared that premature approval might leave 
France inferior to the other Powers, who would copy the design.
15
 Nonetheless, in 1896 the 
Superior War Committee (Comité Supérieure de Guerre – CSG - a forum comprising the 
senior commanders and chaired by the Chief of the General Staff - CGS) endorsed the 
weapon. In 1897-8 it entered into mass production, before its eventual public disclosure on 
Bastille Day 1899.
16
  
These security precautions were exceptional, and although other governments were aware 
before 1899 that a new weapon was coming, the details of the recoil-absorption mechanism 
remained concealed for years.
17
 While Deport and Sainte-Claire Deville developed model 
75C, moreover, work continued on three others: 75A, 75B, and 75D. Mathieu and his 
successor Deloye considered C the most promising, but B a back-up. They hoped the 
Germans’ intelligence would mistake the direction of French research and be diverted down a 
blind alley.
18
 It was when the 75C was entering its prototype phase and it was most vital to 
side-track the enemy that the General Staff officer Captain Alfred Dreyfus was falsely 
accused of betraying secrets.
19
 Actually the incriminating note, or bordereau, intercepted in 
the German Embassy in Paris and wrongly alleged to be in Dreyfus’s handwriting, related to 
a different project that may also have been meant to distract the Germans, who remained 
ignorant of the 75mm until it was deployed.
20
 In part for fear of pre-emptive attack, secrecy 
continued during manufacturing.
21
 This re-equipment was one of the biggest ever 
undertaken,
22
 and the Artillery Direction ordered the parts as soon as their designs were ready 
(without waiting for every component to be finalized), 
23
 and dispersed contracts between 
state and private establishments, again to aid deception.
24
 While the development costs came 
from a clandestine fund, administered in the Finance Ministry with the acquiescence of the 
Chamber of Deputies Budget Commission, those for production came from an account 
approved purportedly to demolish the Paris fortifications, under an arrangement agreed by 
President Félix Faure with the Budget Commission and the Council of Ministers.
25
  The 
legislature assigned the equivalent of 226 million francs, compared with the 300 million that 
the War Ministry thought necessary.
26
 Nonetheless, France emerged with what most 
observers judged the best field gun in Europe. 
The key to ‘quick firing’ was the recoil-absorption system that held the 75mm in place even 
when firing dozens of rounds. Its carriage supported a trough-shaped cradle, in which a 
cylinder block contained the hydro-pneumatic braking system, the barrel sliding in guides 
within the cradle and being attached to a piston that formed part of the braking mechanism. 
After recoiling by over a metre the barrel returned smoothly into position.
27
 However, the 
brake took on its full significance only alongside other innovations. A wheel lock provided 
anchorage. Behind the barrel a Nordenfeldt breech screw sealed and reopened the breech with 
a 120-degree turn that a gunner could execute in seconds. The shells were ‘fixed’ rounds, the 
projectile and its base with the propellant comprising a single unit like an enlarged rifle 
cartridge, while as the barrel repositioned it ejected the casing. As the barrel recoiled, the 
aiming sights remained steady, and the weapon was simple enough for an inexperienced crew 
to operate.
28
 According to one commentator, it would douse the selected terrain and alter 
direction like a municipal water sprinkler.
29
 Moreover, the gunners could continue working 
without needing to jump clear, being protected by a nickel-steel gunshield. The caissons, 
once rotated from their horizontal travelling position to the vertical for unloading, presented 
an armoured underside towards the enemy that enlarged the shielded zone. Finally, although 
the French had organized their de Bange field guns in batteries of six, they judged that a four-
gun 75mm battery could match a six-gun German one, being more manoeuvrable and easier 
to supply. Four guns could be transported with more caissons than could six, and therefore 
each could fire more rounds.
30
 Hence the French adopted four-gun batteries, though keeping 
twenty-three batteries per army corps, so that the guns per corps fell from 138 to 92. The 
General Staff warned that if Germany did not drop to four-gun batteries for its own quick-
firer the issue must be reviewed.
31
 
The new weapon’s tactical mission had been identified by General Hippolyte Langlois, 
whom Sainte-Claire Deville consulted, and who had foreseen the use of quick-firing field 
guns.
32
 Langlois wanted to project deep cone-shaped showers of shrapnel over the enemy 
infantry: mobility and speed were crucial, for surprise and shock, and to pre-empt the 
opposing artillery.
33
 This was actually a defensive concept, directed towards halting invaders 
in the open, and it matched the counterstroke approach of French strategic thinking. Until 
1891 French planning for another war with Germany was purely defensive, but over the next 
two decades the General Staff increasingly envisaged the doctrine of a counter-offensive, 
though only after halting the initial enemy onslaught.
34
 The 75mm was particularly designed, 
moreover, for indirect fire, that is ‘fire by artillery … at targets that cannot be seen from the 
weapon’s own position’.35 French gunners had pioneered indirect shooting guided by forward 
observers. Longer ranges facilitated it, and – though depending on the circumstances - 
smokeless powder left unconcealed weapons more visible. Both the 75mm’s stability on 
firing and its novel sighting equipment suited the new tactic, its object being an intense and 
accurate surprise bombardment from a hidden position.
36
  
 
The Germans were wrong-footed. In the Franco-Prussian War Krupp’s steel breech-loaders, 
positioned forward in dense masses, had overwhelmed their opponents.
37
 Subsequently the 
C73, also a Krupp design, became the standard German field gun.
38
 By the later 1880s, 
however, the C73s, like the de Banges, were outdated, while France’s military renaissance 
and its 1891-4 alliance with Russia made Germany seem more exposed.
40
 Yet whereas the 
Prusso-German Great General Staff (GGS) stressed firepower, the General Inspector of 
Artillery valued mobility, and the War Ministry fretted about the extra weight and fragility of 
a hydraulic brake.
41
 Nonetheless, in 1892 the Ministry asked Krupp to design a quick-firer.
42
 
Meanwhile, Haussmann, who had ready another design, moved to the Rheinische 
Metallwarenfabrik (Rhenish Metalware Plant – Rheinmetall), a firm known to the army 
hitherto as a shell manufacturer. Although Rheinmetall’s founder, Heinrich Ehrhardt, claimed 
the credit for Haussner’s efforts,43 the latter continued working on his model and the firm 
took out a patent for a long-recoil quick-firing gun. The War Ministry’s artillery testing 
commission (Artillerie-Prüfungs-Kommission – APK) found it interesting but not yet usable 
in war.
44
 But Krupp too failed to develop a serviceable quick-firer, and concluded that recoil-
absorption systems could not be applied successfully to field guns.
45
 Instead the army settled 
on a non-quick-firing Krupp design, the 7.7cm FK (Feldkanone –  field cannon) C96 (later 
FK 96).
46
 The War Ministry argued retrospectively that when Emperor Wilhelm II approved 
the order the C73s were worn out, the French 75mm remained secret, and no viable German 
quick-firer was available.
47
 Yet the 75mm would immediately outclass the FK 96, and the 
French delayed deployment of their gun until the Germans were committed to an inferior 
weapon that would cost them 140 million marks.
48
 The FK 96 satisfied the War Ministry’s 
concern for mobility (in what was planned to be an offensive campaign): it weighed 600 lbs 
less than the C73 and was also lighter than the 75mm. But although Krupp had built in a 
Federsporn (spring spike), the gun still jumped on firing and had to be re-laid. It delivered 5-
9 rounds per minute, which was 2-3 times faster than the C73 but nothing like the 75mm. Its 
range was only one kilometre greater than the C73’s, and it carried no shield.49  
Re-equipping the field artillery was a hugely costly undertaking that occurred only at 
intervals of several years. Adopting the FK 96 not merely condemned the Germans to what 
their War Ministry acknowledged was a period of inferiority,
50
 but also impinged on the next 
armament cycle. Commentators condemned the gun as being a sitting target for the 75mm, 
the War Minister and GGS agreeing that the situation was ‘extremely grave’.51 Once the 
75mm had proved itself operationally during the European campaign in China against the 
Boxer Rising, Wilhelm II therefore insisted on a recoil-absorption system.
52
 Ehrhardt had 
resumed work on its quick-firers and Krupp also renewed its efforts, the APK commissioning 
both companies to develop a new model. The process still proved arduous, showing that the 
French had kept their secret and the Germans must find their own solution.
53
 Moreover, 
money was tight. Under its 1898 and 1900 Navy Laws, Germany boosted expenditure on 
warships, and Karl von Einem (who became War Minister in 1903), had other priorities and 
was slow to concede that the 75mm was superior.
54
 Hence the ministry sought an upgraded 
FK 96 rather than a completely new gun,
55
 while the Reichstag Budget Commission refused 
finance for new barrels.
56
 Eventually the state works at Spandau designed the ponderously 
entitled 77mm FK 96 n/A (Field cannon 96 neuer Art – new type). Approved in 1904, it 
incorporated the FK 96’s barrel, wheels, and axle. Krupp reduced the calibre, but the recoil 
absorption system owed more to Ehrhardt.
57
 The weapon had a bigger gunshield than the 
75mm,
58
and a better aiming system. It met the APK’s requirements for durability, as well as 
the GGS’s for lightness and manoeuvrability, not only in Western Europe but also along the 
muddy tracks of the east.
59
 Indeed, German commentators thought the 75mm had sacrificed 
mobility for firepower.
60
 But the new gun fired a lighter shell than the 75mm, and because of 
the recycled barrel it had a kilometre shorter range, which might not matter in close-quarter 
encounters between fast moving armies, but in trench warfare would matter considerably. Its 
rate of fire was perhaps just half its French counterpart’s.61 Given the French and German 
guns’ contrasting missions (the French envisaging an initial strategic defensive, the Germans 
an opening attack), which of them prevailed would largely depend on the circumstances in 
which battle was joined. 
Manufacturing and deploying the FK 96 n/A was another enormous undertaking that would 
cost some 300 million gold marks, but Einem began unobtrusively.
62
 Even the title – 
suggesting a mere modification to the FK 96 – obscured its significance.63 However, in 1905-
6 the process accelerated because of the opening instalment in a succession of European 
diplomatic confrontations, the First Moroccan Crisis. In fact neither Emperor Wilhelm nor 
Chancellor Bernard von Bülow intended to use the episode to provoke a war,
64
 and whereas 
Schlieffen saw an opportunity for a preventive strike westwards while Russia fought Japan, 
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who replaced Schlieffen during the crisis, was more 
circumspect.
65
 Although Einem claimed in his memoirs to have advocated war, at the time he 
admitted to Wilhelm that the French artillery remained superior, and he wanted to postpone a 
showdown until the re-equipping was finished.
66
 Military circles – and Wilhelm himself - 
saw ‘really considerable disadvantages’ in fighting while Germany’s guns were being 
replaced.
67
 Speeding the re-equipping was the most significant military measure the Germans 
undertook during the crisis, but they concealed the acceleration as they intended it as a 
precaution rather than as a warning gesture to intimidate the French. Indeed, Einem advised 
Bülow that going still faster would mean persuading Krupp and Ehrhardt to suspend work on 
their export orders: a move so conspicuous that it might provoke war when Germany did not 
want it.
68
 After the crisis ended in a compromise unfavourable to Germany, Einem still 
resisted further acceleration. When Bülow asked whether anything was needed to raise the 
army’s readiness, Einem did not mention the field guns.69 He considered the re-equipping 
was now making ‘an excellent impression’ abroad and ‘thereby preserves peace’, but he did 
not want to cause ‘disquiet’ abroad or overstrain Reich finances.70 Only by the end of 1908 
was the task complete.
71
  
Conversely, when the crisis started, in most respects other than the 75mm the French were 
unprepared. But subsequently they stepped up their readiness, while the Germans failed to 
reciprocate. Actually French intelligence had quickly detected their adversary’s re-equipping, 
and the French General Staff (Etat-major de l’armée – EMA) warned during the crisis that 
the new German gun was comparable to France’s and the situation ‘extremely serious’.72 The 
FK 96 n/A was not just a modification but a completely novel system: ‘willy nilly we are 
obliged to follow it along this road, or suffer material and especially moral inferiority’.73 
Other French experts believed the 75mm remained superior to the FK 96 n/A: faster, more 
accurate, and easier to use, and less conspicuous because possessing lower wheels, if 
admittedly less manoeuvrable.
74
 But certainly France’s qualitative superiority had narrowed, 
which made its quantitative inferiority more pressing. The EMA had expected the Germans 
also to adopt four-gun batteries with fewer guns per corps,
75
 but in fact Germany kept its six-
gun batteries and soon had 144 field guns (plus additional howitzers) per corps against 
France’s 92.76 Moreover, under General Schubert, a new Inspector-General of Field Artillery, 
the Germans increasingly practised indirect fire, acquiring better rangefinders, new 
telephones and cable, and observation towers.
77
 In response the French enlarged the 75mm’s 
shield.
78
 Under Schubert’s opposite number, General Percin, they shifted in their 1910 
tactical regulations towards ‘neutralizing’ rather than destroying the German artillery, 
protecting their infantry by temporarily suppressing the enemy’s fire but economizing on 
munitions.
79
  
French anxiety spilled out into mainstream debate: both in the Paris press and in the 
legislature, where deputies became more willing to loosen the purse strings.
80
 Most of the 
75mm stock was still in good condition, though ageing.
81
 Four-gun batteries required more 
officers and gunners than did six-gun ones, however, and in autumn 1908, against the 
background of the Bosnian Annexation Crisis in the Balkans and of the Casablanca Deserters 
incident (a mini-crisis over Morocco), the War Minister General Brun introduced an artillery 
reinforcement bill that became law in July 1909.
82
 The EMA believed it urgent to redress 
France’s numerical inferiority:83 which the measure would indeed do, but by creating 
additional batteries only on mobilization. Brun told the Chamber Army Commission that the 
75mm and FK 96 n/A were roughly equivalent, and that France’s recent shortening of its 
conscription term meant less seasoned infantry who would need greater artillery backing.
84
 
Because France remained committed to the four-gun battery,
85
 it could not in peacetime 
match Germany’s 144 guns per corps, but by forming 159 new 75mm batteries it could raise 
the guns per corps from 92 to 120, and on mobilization to 144.
86
 The law therefore very 
substantially augmented French firepower, and improved the crews’ training and cohesion.87 
It cost 59 million francs initially and 14.5 million more each year,
88
 but Moltke, impressed, 
believed France had the men and money to keep up the pace.
89
 Indeed, he advised the law 
had restored French superiority.
90
 In response the Germans similarly invested in FK 96 n/As, 
their total of six-gun batteries rising from 574 to 633 between 1905 and 1912-13.
91
 All the 
same, on the eve of war both French and German field gun numbers were reaching a plateau.   
 
The 75mm’s example generated pressures to follow suit not just in Germany but also across 
Europe.
92
 It is necessary first to consider France’s principal ally, and Russia’s abortive effort 
- through what became the First Hague Peace Conference - to avert a new round of 
escalation. In August 1898 a Russian circular to the Powers proposed a conference on arms 
limitation. It emerged from months of discussion in St Petersburg, after the War Minister, 
Aleksey Kuropatkin, briefed Tsar Nicholas II in February on the 75mm and FK 96. Adopting 
quick-firers, Kuropatkin estimated, would cost Russia 130 million roubles (when large sums 
were going on the navy and on a build-up in East Asia, and borrowing was increasingly 
difficult). It would cost Russia’s rival, Austria-Hungary, 100 million. Hence Kuropatkin 
proposed a convention with Austria-Hungary to hold off artillery renewal for ten years. 
Nicholas was receptive, and urged an approach to the Foreign Minister, Mikhail Muraviev.
 93
 
Russia’s existing field guns, Kuropatkin told Muraviev, could fire one round per minute; but 
the FK 96 and the model Russia was currently working on fired six. Should one Power 
introduce such formidable weaponry, every other must strive ‘feverishly’ to copy it. In 
contrast, the present moment was favourable for Russia and Austria-Hungry to call a pause 
(thus the initiative heeded Russian interests) and to ban field guns that fired over three rounds 
per minute.
94
  
Kuropatkin’s initiative was soon diluted.95 Muraviev felt that Germany’s re-equipment made 
for urgency. But he foresaw that a Russo-Austrian convention would disadvantage both 
Powers against others, and anyway that Austria-Hungary’s ally Germany would resist such 
an arrangement. Besides, experience showed that it was almost impossible to check the 
spread of innovation, although it might be feasible to cap military personnel and budgets, 
which would be easier to monitor and could benefit Russia disproportionately because of its 
large standing army.
96
 The Foreign Ministry also hoped, however, by highlighting Russia’s 
peaceable intentions, to facilitate expansion in East Asia.
97
 Hence the August circular was 
more self-interested and less specific than Kuropatkin had envisaged. Nicholas’s ‘chief 
object’, said Muraviev, was to ‘plant the germ that he desired to see fructify’.98  
Russia’s calculated vagueness headed off a confrontation with its ally. No prior consultation 
took place with Paris: the Russians arguing that had the proposal emanated from the Franco-
Russian bloc the Central Powers would have peremptorily rejected it. French journalists were 
bewildered, and French military circles downcast.
99
 According to Kuropatkin, who made a 
damage limitation visit to Paris, the army chiefs, the War Minister, and President Faure 
feared that in order to avoid expenditure on quick-firers the Russians would deprive France of 
the 75mm, forfeiting an opportunity to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine. Kuropatkin reassured his 
hosts that Russia proposed not disarmament but arms limitation,
100
 and on this basis the 
French agreed to attend the conference. But the Russians also gave assurances to Germany; 
and the agenda they circulated in January 1899 included restrictions on automatic rifles and 
on dropping high explosives from balloons, but not on quick-firing guns. Quick-firers figured 
only briefly in the Hague conference’s first commission, and Russia did not press the issue; 
while expenditure ceilings were soon abandoned as impractical.
101
Although the German 
delegation gained notoriety for publicly opposing arms limitation, the Austro-Hungarians, 
British, Americans, and French privately felt likewise.
102
 Indeed the Russians themselves had 
now decided to acquire quick-firers. Their Finance Minister told the Germans that his country 
could afford rearmament;
103
 Kuropatkin told the French that because at least for the first-line 
corps he could wait no longer, he would probably buy guns from abroad, although he wanted 
to order as much as possible from domestic industry.
104
 Finally, Nicholas himself had been 
reading the celebrated work of Ivan Bloch, The War of the Future, and met its author, who 
who supported the thesis that warfare was becoming impossibly destructive by contending 
that since 1870 artillery had become twelve to fifteen times more powerful.
105
 However, 
Nicholas’s uncle, Grand Duke Alexei, believed experience showed that armaments were a 
guarantee of peace and Russia could afford the expenditure, Nicholas’s mother and wife also 
favoured introducing the new weapons, and the tsar concurred that Russia must avoid giving 
the impression that in the competition for weaponry it could not hold its own.
106
  
The Hague Conference thus confirmed the absence of support for renouncing quick-firers. 
Soon they spread to every major army: not to mention smaller ones. Few countries had the 
capacity and expertise to supply themselves, but by 1906 Krupp and Ehrhardt as well as the 
French companies Schneider, Saint-Chamond and Châtillon-Commentry all had export 
models available. They sold to the Low Countries and to Scandinavia as well as to the USA, 
which purchased from Ehrhardt.
107
 Even Belgium, which had a large home-grown armaments 
industry, turned abroad. As late as 1908 Belgian field batteries still had pre-quick-firers 
resembling Germany’s C73,108 but they were replaced by Krupp 75mm models that in trials 
outperformed Saint-Chamond - not the sole occasion on which Germany’s arms concerns 
equipped potential adversaries.
109
 Similarly, in South-Eastern Europe Krupp supplied Turkey 
and Romania while Schneider supplied Bulgaria and Serbia.
110
 Serbia’s conversion was 
particularly fraught, as its traditional armourer was Austria-Hungary, but after a dynastic 
coup in 1903 the Serbs loosened their ties with Vienna. A commission considered German, 
Austrian, and French models before opting for Schneider, a purchase facilitated by a Franco-
German bank loan.
111
 Although the order took years to execute, a neighbour that the 
Austrians found increasingly threatening no longer bought its field guns from them.   
In the first phase of the quick-firing revolution, indeed, which centred on light field guns, 
Germany’s partners, Italy and Austria-Hungary, adapted less successfully than did France’s 
partners, Russia and Britain. The balance of advantage shifted not only against Germany and 
towards France but also against the Central Powers collectively and towards the emerging 
Triple Entente.  
Britain’s transition was smoothest. Re-equipment had been mooted before the 1899-1902 
South African War, but if undertaken so early might have saddled the British with another 
pre-quick-firer and ensnared them in the same trap as the Germans.
112
 Instead the precipitant 
was the Royal Artillery’s poor performance on the veldt against Boer guns supplied by 
Schneider and Krupp. As a result, its equipment was completely replaced, the Ordnance QF 
18-pounder and 13-pounder becoming the standard Royal Field Artillery and Royal Horse 
Artillery arms. In 1901 the Special Committee on Horse and Field Artillery Equipment was 
established with Cabinet approval. Also known as the Marshall Committee after its chair, 
Major-General George Marshall,
113
 it was asked to consider ‘whether a system in which the 
gun recoils on a cradle, recoil being checked by hydraulic buffers and the gun returned to 
position by springs, is permissible or desirable’.114 It interviewed representatives from the 
biggest arms firms, Armstrong and Vickers, and from Woolwich Arsenal. The Vickers 
spokesman insisted that twenty rounds per minute were attainable with a French-style long 
recoil: ‘Provided the gun comes back after firing without throwing the sight out, there is no 
reason why the rate of fire should not be controlled by the rate of loading’.115 Although the 
French police prevented British observers from inspecting the 75mm close-up,
116
 its influence 
was once more evident. Similarly, when the committee’s first report stressed lightness and 
mobility and seemed uncertain whether these were achievable with an apparatus that 
eliminated recoil, the Director-General of Ordnance, Sir Henry Brackenbury (who was well 
informed about Continental developments) pressed for clarification. Marshall replied that ‘if 
a high rate of fire is obtainable only with a system of cradle and buffer, the committee is 
prepared to accept them despite the disadvantages’.117 This ruling set the course towards 
quick-firing, and the 18-pounder would discharge up to twenty rounds per minute, with a 
bigger calibre (83.8mm) than either the 75mm or the 96 n/A.
118
 The committee recommended 
an Armstrong barrel, a Vickers recoil-absorption system, and Woolwich sights and caissons. 
One member saw no need for an intermediate weapon between the 13-pounder and the heavy 
artillery, but Prime Minister Arthur Balfour judged the 18-pounder also necessary.
119
 All the 
same, the expense was daunting. Finally, under pressure from The Times, the War Office 
ordered the new guns, although initially re-equipping the Indian army. Once again the First 
Moroccan Crisis lent urgency, and the British Isles regained priority: the six home infantry 
divisions and one cavalry division being re-equipped by 1906.
120
 This was the biggest such 
undertaking in the British army’s history, costing over £4 million, and when as Secretary for 
War Richard Burdon Haldane reorganized the British Expeditionary Force, he doubled the 
batteries available on mobilization from forty-two to eighty-one.
121
   
In Russia the impetus towards quick-firers came not just from fear that Austria-Hungary 
would adopt them but also from the mistaken supposition that Germany already had done. In 
summer 1898 the Russian War Ministry decided it must follow suit, which helps explain 
quick-firers’ sidelining at The Hague. According to the ministry, ‘Our artillery must no doubt 
follow the example of the artillery of the Western armies in order not to fall behind them in 
armament and effect of fire; but rearming the artillery will cause us great difficulty both 
because of significance of expenditure and because of limited production resources and 
consequent inability to fill orders for a large number of guns, carriages, and shells in any kind 
of short time period.’122 Given the urgency, approaches went to Krupp, Saint-Chamond, and 
Schneider, but the model adopted came from the largest Russian private arms firm, Putilov.
123
 
The French seem not to have disclosed the 75mm’s secrets even to their ally, and Russia’s 
76mm M 1900 was steadied by a crude system of rubber rings along the trail.
124
 Despite 
fearing its carriage was unstable, Kuropatkin still rushed into production.
125
 In contrast, the 
gun’s successor (also from Putilov), the 76mm M 1902, featured a hydraulic recoil-
absorption system. If heavier than the German and Austrian field gun, it was lighter than 
France’s 75mm, and longer-range than other quick-firers. Yet it frequently broke down and 
the brake was inefficient, so the weapon still moved on firing and delivered only ten rounds 
per minute.
126
 Its designers economized on nickel in the barrel, whose rifling wore down 
quickly, and at night the muzzle flash betrayed the location. These defects exposed the 
limitations of Russian engineering, and German commentators considered the M 1902 barely 
serviceable.
127
 Moreover, distribution was exceedingly slow. At the time of Russia’s 
humiliation in the 1908-9 Bosnian Crisis the M 1902 guns still lacked shields and panoramic 
sights.
128
 Only after the establishment in 1911 of an inquiry commission was the re-
equipment process finished.
129
  
The Russians, like the Germans therefore transferred in two stages, and found the adjustment 
difficult. Even so, by 1914 they had accomplished it, whereas Austria-Hungary had done so 
only very inadequately, and Italy’s transition remained incomplete. Although Italy also had a 
sizeable armaments industry, much of it was foreign owned. By 1898 the army recognized a 
pressing need to update its 75B and 87B Krupp-model guns.
130
 However, the War Ministry 
opened bids for a replacement that lacked a recoil-absorption mechanism, the ministry 
experts fearing such a device would be too fragile and being so briefed by the Krupp 
representative (who concealed that his company had failed to perfect one).
131
 Hence another 
Krupp design, the 75A, not a quick-firer, was chosen to replace the 75B. Sixty million lire 
were earmarked for another weapon that proved obsolete once France unveiled the 75mm. 
Even after this experience, a special commission on 87B replacement preferred a further 
Krupp model to a War Ministry one, and the minister signed the contracts, presenting 
parliament with a fait accompli.
132
 Although the order was not to be completed until 1910-13, 
criticism of the new Krupp gun began at once, spiced by corruption allegations and 
prompting yet a further investigation.
133
 To succeed to the 75A the Italians therefore settled 
on a new design by Colonel Deport, the father of France’s 75mm, to be manufactured by an 
Italian consortium.
134
 The technology was extremely innovative – a split trail enabled the 
barrel to be angled higher - but Italian steel proved defective and the consortium failed to 
deliver on time.
135
 Even when Italy joined the war in 1915 its re-equipment was barely 
complete.
136
  
Austria-Hungary was little better situated. Traditionally its guns came from the state-run 
Vienna Arsenal, which private concerns - especially Skoda – were overtaking in expertise. 
Major-General Franz von Uchatius had invented a ‘steel-bronze’ material for the gun barrels, 
which partly for financial reasons the Austrians used instead of nickel steel. By the 1890s 
they too needed to replace their stock, but the War Ministry’s Technical Military Committee 
favoured not acting precipitately but instead fitting a tail spur to the existing weapon. The 
resulting M 75/96 lacked a recoil brake or shield. In 1906 Schlieffen warned his Austrian 
counterpart that the gun was outdated, and Wilhelm II reiterated the message.
137
 After 
prolonged negotiations, the Austrians purchased the rights to the Ehrhardt design, and built 
the FK M5, which resembled Germany’s FK 96 n/A. Skoda manufactured the carriage, which 
possessed a recoil-absorption mechanism; but the steel-bronze barrels were heavy and liable 
to warp, and the gun still lagged in range and rate of fire, while shortages of funds and of 
personnel delayed its introduction.
138
 Admittedly, one of Austria-Hungary’s major actions 
during the Bosnian Annexation Crisis was to speed up the re-equipping.
139
 After 1909 the 
army had a reasonably up-to-date field gun, but this was the only quick-firing weapon in 
service and its numbers remained few. On the eve of war, infantry divisions in the Austro-
Hungarian common army typically possessed forty-two field guns, against fifty-four in their 
German counterparts. In the Landwehr and Honvéd divisions controlled by the governments 
of the Dual Monarchy’s Austrian and Hungarian halves, the guns per division numbered 
twenty-four. The reasons were political as well as financial: the Landwehr and the Honvéd 
were considered potential vehicles for separatism. Yet the upshot was that Austria-Hungary’s 
army remained relatively ‘the most undergunned … in Europe’.140  
  
Quick-firing, however, was applicable not just to light field guns. Given that by 1908 the 
latter had largely been converted, the major subsequent development was the extension of the 
new technology to curved-trajectory and to heavy artillery. Through this process the Germans 
substantially retrieved their position, only as 1914 approached to find it once again in danger. 
Rather than diversifying France’s artillery portfolio, the 1909 law had intensified French 
reliance on the 75mm. Heavier weapons, the Paris War Ministry feared, would complicate 
supply, and delay the field army or lag behind it. But in other armies heavy guns were 
becoming field weapons, in the second stage of the quick-firing revolution. Technically the 
second stage differed little from the first, although commonly the braking devices were 
duplicated, one being placed on either side of the barrel. Weapons firing at higher angles had 
less space for recoil without the barrel hitting the ground, and heavier shells needed more 
propellant and caused greater wear.
141
 Nonetheless, from the turn of the century these 
challenges were surmounted.  
Germany equipped itself not only with the FK 96 n/A but also with quick-firing light field 
howitzers and heavy field cannon. Schlieffen gave encouragement, as he wanted greater 
mobile firepower for a westward offensive,
142
 and Russia’s siege of Plevna in 1877-78 had 
shown that against entrenched infantry flat-trajectory bombardments achieved little. Though 
meant to plug this gap, the 1898 105mm field howitzer was controversial: critics found it too 
short-range, and it lacked a shield. Wilhelm ordered its upgrading and it received a recoil 
brake, the resulting 10.5cm FH 98/09 being deployed from 1908 for use against enemy 
artillery protected by gunshields as well as against dug-in infantry.
143
 Adopting it meant 
abandoning plans for unified training and shell supply across the field artillery, and financial 
constraints limited its numbers.
144
 Still, by 1914 whereas the field artillery of a French army 
corps still entirely comprised 75mms, that of a German corps was about one fifth field 
howitzers. On the eve of war, the peacetime German army had 3,786 field guns in 642 
batteries; on mobilization, 6,326 in 1,069 batteries, of which 5,076 were FK 96 n/A and 1,230 
were FH 98/09.
145
 Schlieffen’s planning also necessitated greater focus on the heavy artillery: 
not just siege artillery against steel and concrete fortresses but also heavy cannon and 
howitzers that could (if necessary by being temporarily dismantled) be horse-drawn. In 1896 
the Heavy Field Artillery (Schwere Artillerie des Feldheeres) was created to incorporate the 
mobile heavy-gun battalions,
146
 and the German army’s first quick-firer was actually a heavy 
field howitzer, the schwere Feldhaubitze 02. Other heavy quick-firers followed, including the 
10cm Kanone 04 and a 21cm howitzer in 1910, in this weapons branch Krupp taking the 
lead.
147
 Having deployed the FK 96 n/A, ministers now concentrated on the heavy guns.  
Other armies lagged. In 1914 Belgium still lacked modern heavy artillery. Austria-Hungary 
had a handful of Skoda 30.5cm siege mortars; otherwise its heavy quick-firers were only 
prototypes.
148
 An Italian law of 1910 provided for a heavy field artillery but in 1914 just half 
the heavy field howitzers (again supplied by Krupp) were ready, and none of the heavy field 
cannon,
149
 while a light field howitzer remained at the planning stage.
150
 It was true that 
France’s Entente partners made more progress. The British Expeditionary Force’s artillery 
resembled the German mixed pattern. It complemented the 18-pounder field gun with an 
efficient quick-firer, the 1908 4.5ʺ light howitzer. Partly due to South African experience, it 
also had some mobile heavy guns.
151
 German observers were impressed, although the BEF 
remained small.
152
 In contrast the Russians occupied a half-way house between Germany’s 
and Britain’s mixed portfolios and France’s reliance on the 75mm. Among the lessons of the 
Russo-Japanese War was that more heavy weapons were needed.
153
 But after the defeat the 
tsarist army budget was squeezed, and rolling out the M 1902 light field gun was the priority, 
German observers judging Russia’s heavy artillery wholly outdated.154 In 1913 they still 
thought Russia’s artillery backwardness offset its greater numbers of cavalry and infantry.155 
After 1909, however, as the tsarist economy recovered and planners turned to rearmament, 
Germany rather than France served as the model. This meant field howitzers and heavy field 
artillery, though neither of Russian design.
156
 A Krupp-model field howitzer was adopted for 
manufacture by the Obukhov and Putilov works,
157
 and by 1914 probably most Russian army 
corps had such equipment, German business again assisting a potential adversary. For the 
heavier weapons, however, Russia went to its ally, ordering one hundred and twenty 120mm 
heavy field guns from Schneider.
158
 In a review of tsarist war readiness in February 1914 the 
GGS warned that further increases in light field howitzers and heavy field artillery were 
impending.
159
 Indeed the artillery was at the heart of Russia’s ‘Great Programme’ of army 
expansion that became law in July 1914. The programme followed an agreement with the 
French to build strategic railways to the western border, and it complemented the adoption of 
an offensive war plan, Schedule No. 19A.
160
 War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov sought 
stronger and more mobile backing for the infantry advance by doubling the heavy artillery 
and raising each army corps’ quick-firing field guns up to parity with Germany. For these 
purposes he would recruit some 89,000 additional personnel.
161
  
On the eve of war Russia planned to reinforce its artillery both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. France planned likewise, and the GGS was well informed about both 
countries.
162
 But whereas the timing of the innovation cycle had favoured France with the 
75mm, a decade later circumstances were less propitious. Down to 1905, in the opinion of 
many French and even German observers, France possessed artillery superiority over 
Germany.
163
 Thereafter, however, historians have detected a relaxation of French effort while 
Germany deployed the FK 96 n/A and FH 98/09, with heavy quick-firers closely 
following.
164
 It is true the French introduced the 1904 155mm Rimailho, whose designer, 
Captain Rimailho, had assisted Sainte-Claire Deville in perfecting the 75mm. The Rimailho’s 
quick-firing mechanism resembled that of the 75mm, and it was meant to be an equally 
mobile but more powerful weapon that could target entrenchments.
165
 Unfortunately the 
Rimailho proved disappointingly short-range, and few were built. It was difficult to supply, 
and unpopular with its crews.
166
 The GGS thought it too heavy and ballistically poor.
167
 Yet it 
remained France’s only quick-firing heavy gun, even though soon after the 1909 law debate 
resumed over whether deploying more 75mms sufficed against Germany’s re-emerging 
advantage.
168
  
Matters came to a head after the Second Moroccan (Agadir) Crisis in 1911, when France and 
Germany seemed on the brink of war. The French Premier during the crisis, Joseph Caillaux, 
regarded artillery inferiority as one reason to seek compromise,
169
 and both War Minister 
Adolphe Messimy and Messimy’s successor, Alexandre Millerand, lent new energy to 
military preparation, as did Joseph Joffre, newly appointed as CGS. At a sombre CSG 
meeting at the height of the tension, members were briefed that the FK 96 n/A was 
comparable to the 75mm and outnumbered it; that the Germans were catching up in indirect 
fire, and their light field howitzers and heavy artillery could silence the French field guns. 
With Messimy’s backing General Augustin Dubail urged that France too needed a light field 
howitzer and heavy field artillery, not only for defensive operations but also to advance 
across the border.
170
 France’s changing artillery requirements, indeed, were linked to a more 
aggressive military strategy: by 1911-12 the EMA sensed that the strategic balance was 
moving against the Central Powers and it might be possible to launch a Franco-Russian 
offensive without first absorbing a German blow.
171
 Still, the CSG was supportive, and 
established an implementation commission under General Lamothe.
172
 In the more senior 
Conseil supérieur de la défense nationale (Superior Committee for National Defence - CSDN 
- attended by French politicians) Messimy reiterated that France needed both a field howitzer 
and heavy field artillery, seconding fortress guns for the latter purpose as an interim 
measure.
173
 The army was improving its supply networks, and France like Germany was 
introducing tractors to pull heavy guns. Under Millerand, the War Ministry began 
commissioning.
174
 
Yet even after a report by one of France’s foremost artillery experts, General Frédéric-
Georges Herr, underlined heavy guns’ importance in the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, urgency was 
lacking.
175
 Millerand’s successor reduced an order for two hundred and twenty 105mm 
Schneider long-range heavy cannon to one for thirty-six, which would become operational 
only from September 1914.
176
 In addition the legislature cancelled the field howitzer in 
favour of the plaquette Malandrin, a disc fitted to the 75mm’s shells to curve their trajectory. 
It was expected to cost 500,000 francs for a few weeks’ work, whereas developing the field howitzer 
would cost 80 million over several years. This new loss of momentum was therefore partly due 
to resource deficiencies, the War Ministry in 1913 being preoccupied with securing extra 
manpower by lengthening military service from two to three years. Legislation for a big 
equipment credit was authorized by the parliamentary finance commission in March 1913 but 
passed only in July 1914. It released 755 million francs, of which 404 million would go on 
artillery, but like Russia’s Great Programme it came too late.177 Moreover, the state arsenals 
had been run down since building the 75mm and had lost key personnel to private industry, 
whereas firms like Schneider could be slow and expensive suppliers.
178
 Yet even given the 
constraints placed on the War Ministry, progress was disappointing: suggesting to the 
Germans that the French were uncertain about how best to proceed.  
German observers acknowledged French fears that heavy ordnance would reduce 
manoeuvrability. Whereas German planners expected big guns to support an advance, many 
French officers still considered heavy weapons an encumbrance.
179
 The President of the 
Technical Committee still judged the 75mm at least the equal of any other light field gun in 
the world.
180
 The French General Staff advised that as the 75mm fired heavier shells than the 
FK 96 n/A a light field howitzer was unnecessary (although in fact the plaquette Malandrin 
would prove in wartime to be worse than useless, causing projectiles to fall short on France’s 
own troops).
181
 Hence the EMA prepared a more offensive strategy (shortly to be embodied 
in France’s Plan XVII), while acknowledging that little had been done to broaden the artillery 
portfolio;
182
 the 75mm remained the best gun of its type and could defeat Germany’s FK 96 
n/A and light field howitzers. It should remain France’s principal weapon, rather than being 
supplementary.
184
 Joffre later blamed the delay in modernization on parsimony in the 
legislature and perfectionism in the War Ministry’s technical services, against which he 
carried less authority than did Schlieffen and Moltke. Yet in January 1914 he himself 
submitted what he later acknowledged to be a misleadingly reassuring assessment: ‘a mobile 
artillery, knowing how to utilize the terrain, will rarely have need of a long-range cannon to 
place itself a good distance from the enemy’.185 The upshot was that when on 1 April the 
French army created its first regiments of heavy field artillery (at the same time as Plan XVII 
took effect), their equipment comprised Rimailhos, seconded fortress artillery, and 
nineteenth-century pre-quick-firers.
186
 The objective remained to neutralize the German guns 
rather than destroy them,
187
 and the 1913 regulations discouraged massive application of 
artillery and stressed economy with munitions.
188
 The gunners were not to prepare infantry 
attacks through preliminary bombardments, but to support them once underway:
189
 a doctrine 
soon invalidated by bitter experience and revised in the war’s second month.190   
On 5-6 July 1914 Germany’s leaders secretly promised support to Austria-Hungary for an 
attack on Serbia in response to the assassinations at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg acknowledged the risk of a general European conflict. But whereas 
Germany had passed (and largely implemented) two major army laws in 1912 and 1913, 
France and Russia’s new programmes would take full effect only by 1917-18. In fact the 
evolving balance in quick-firing artillery encapsulated that in land armaments as a whole. 
Krupp’s head, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, reassured Wilhelm that the potential 
enemy artilleries were neither good nor complete, whereas Germany’s had ‘never been 
better’; field artillery officers felt more confident than in years about their equipment and 
tactics.
191
 Although Moltke was absent during the first phase of decisionmaking, and asserted 
himself more vigorously only after returning to Berlin in late July, by then the Germans had 
received an exceptional piece of corroborating intelligence. On 13 July Charles Humbert 
addressed the French Senate, decrying France’s artillery unpreparedness.192 The next day 
Major Klüber, Germany’s military attaché, met Colonel Dupont, the head of the EMA’s 
Second Bureau (intelligence), who spoke remarkably freely on matters he assumed the 
Germans knew about anyway. Germany, said Dupont, had gained an enormous advantage in 
heavy field ordnance - the Rimailhos were useless and France’s other heavy guns outdated or 
not yet in service - while the 75mm had once been pathbreaking but now was the oldest of its 
type and inferior to the FK 96 n/A. Klüber reported his surprise at how far France had 
dropped behind in manufacturing heavy guns, and that whereas Humbert had denied the 
75mm was outmatched, Dupont accepted it was.
193
 On 31 July, the day the German 
Government decided on general mobilization, Moltke gave three reasons for judging the 
conjuncture favourable. Germany’s rifle outmatched France’s, and because France had just 
called up two new conscript cohorts much of its army was untrained; but his first point was 
Germany’s lead in artillery. France and Russia lacked howitzers and could not hit protected 
infantry, and for the foreseeable future the position would never be more favourable.
194
  The 
GGS supported the civilian leaders in risking war, and when that war became likely the 
artillery situation gave little ground for holding back. 
           
This does not mean that the conflict was premeditated; and here it is necessary to consider 
ammunition.
195
 Shells were the real artillery weapon, the cannons’ and howitzers’ function 
being to deliver them. Light field artillery shells generally carried either high explosive or 
shrapnel charges, the latter set with time fuses and conveying 250-300 lead balls that burst 
over advancing opponents with horrific effect. Although the British 18-pounder had only 
shrapnel munitions, other armies had stocks of both with shrapnel more numerous, the 
proportion of high explosive growing asevidence accumulated that against dug-in troops 
shrapnel was ineffective.
196
 The Russo-Japanese War underlined this lesson, as well as 
suggesting that artillery would engage via indirect fire at longer ranges than had been 
expected, while consuming larger quantities of shells.
197
 To simplify supply, the Germans 
introduced a ‘universal shell’ for the FK 96 n/A that could be adjusted for either mission, 
though consequently delivered less high explosive and fewer shrapnel balls than did its 
single-function 75mm counterparts.
198
 Nonetheless, the Berlin War Ministry wanted the new 
projectile, in part because it could not predict what shrapnel/HE ratio would be needed.
199
  
Over munitions, France and Germany staged an arms race within an arms race. It had been 
known from the start that quick-firers would rapidly exhaust supplies. The British Army 
Council estimated that an 18-pounder battery could fire 3,600-5,400 rounds hourly, and no 
horse-drawn supply system could sustain this rate of expenditure beyond a couple of hours. 
Regulations warned against wasting munitions, and the Army Council allocated to each gun 
500 rounds in the field, though by 1914 it had doubled that allowance.
200
 On the Continent 
the munitions race began after the First Moroccan Crisis, the French in 1906-11 spending 62 
million francs on shells.
201
 By May 1909 stocks were some 800 rounds per gun, but still 
deemed quite inadequate, Premier Georges Clemenceau fearing a re-run of 1870.
202
 Targets 
were raised to 1,200 by 1911.
203
 After the Agadir Crisis Messimy told the CSDN that France 
had reached 1,280 but the goal should now be 1,500, and Joffre agreed that for his offensive 
strategy more was needed, reflecting that ‘Quick-firing artillery is a great consumer of 
munitions’.204 He also wanted 1,500, but the War Ministry technical services claimed to hold 
precise intelligence that France had 50% more rounds per corps than did Germany and 
progress could therefore be slowed.
205
 In fact in August 1914 France possessed 1,390 rounds 
per 75mm, of which 1,190 were ready to fire. Yet French planners envisaged that by Day 
Five the daily output of new 75mm shells would total a mere 13,600, and they made little 
preparation to draw in private industry.
206
 Indeed, contracts signed in 1906 for firms to retain 
the equipment needed for shell manufacture had lapsed, so the army would depend entirely 
on an inadequately equipped state sector.
207
  
Germany had better prepared to manufacture ammunition during hostilities, but French 
intelligence was right that it had fewer rounds immediately available. The Berlin War 
Ministry acknowledged that quick-firers and indirect shooting had heightened consumption, 
and in 1909-14 it raised the shells assigned per FK 96 n/A from 676 to 987.
208
 Even so, the 
Germans knew the French had overtaken them.
209
 In 1912 the War Ministry (mirroring 
Messimy) raised the peacetime target to 1,200, whereas Moltke (mirroring Joffre) preferred 
1,500. The War Ministry said the munitions’ limited shelf life ruled out storing more, as did 
lack of finance: moreover, Russo-Japanese and Balkan War experience suggested 1,200 
would bridge the gap until new production materialized. It anticipated ‘a certain munitions 
tightness’. Actually when war broke out, each field gun and howitzer had about 1,000 
rounds.
210
 In April 1914 Moltke warned that France was spending huge sums, and pressed 
again for faster accumulation: after 30-40 days he expected most stocks to have gone. The 
ministry agreed to accelerate output, but only in the 1915 budgetary cycle: on 18 June 1914 it 
asked Bethmann Hollweg for twenty million marks on the grounds that due to French and 
Russian expenditure, ‘the fastest increase in the munitions reserve is an unavoidable 
demand’.211 For Germany as well as France the urgency therefore heightened, but the War 
Ministry commented retrospectively that it was planning to raise the reserve to 1,200 by 1917 
and this (as well as the failure to stockpile saltpetre for explosives) undermined any allegation 
that Germany had pre-scheduled hostilities for summer 1914.
212
  
 
The First World War became quintessentially a gunners’ conflict. By one reckoning, whereas 
in 1870-1 the two sides had deployed one gun per 350 soldiers, in 1914 they deployed one 
per 200 and in 1916-18 one per 60.
213
 The French army estimated artillery caused 67% of all 
its casualties; the German army attributed to it 75% of its Western Front losses in 1917.
214
 
Yet the campaigning to an extent confirmed both sides’ prognostications. In August 1914, in 
the forested hills of Lorraine and the Ardennes, Germany’s field howitzers adapted better 
than the 75mms and inflicted terrible damage. But by the Battle of the Marne in September 
Germany’s heavy artillery had outrun its supplies, and on flatter terrain France’s 75mms 
proved their worth.
215
 Some fired 1,000 rounds per day, and French commentators thought 
them critical in averting defeat.
216
 Almost half the 75mms were destroyed, worn out, or 
captured in the first fifteen months of conflict.
217
 After the Marne, however, Joffre drastically 
rationed munitions expenditure, and even reintroduced de Bange pre-quick-firers, although 
Germany’s guns also ran short.218 The FK 96 n/A’s mobility helped the Germans conquer 
territory in west and east, but in the trenches proved less advantageous.
219
 Indeed in 1916 
Germany introduced a heavier replacement, though reinstating the FK 96 n/A for the more 
open campaigning of 1918.
220
 Also in 1916, concealed 75mm batteries firing indirectly 
helped to save Verdun, but once the Germans had overrun northern France and Belgium the 
Allies’ imperative was to dislodge them. For this purpose the French and British needed 
heavy and curved-trajectory guns (primarily delivering high-explosive), which took years to 
deploy in adequate numbers with plentiful munitions and experienced crews. On the opening 
morning of the Battle of the Somme, on 1 July 1916, Britain’s devastating losses were due to 
inability to silence the opposing artillery, as much as to the enemy machine guns.
221
 By 1918, 
in contrast, the French army had acquired almost as many heavy field pieces as it had 
75mms,
222
 and Britain’s transition was similar. Still the light field gun took on new roles, 
protecting the infantry with creeping barrages and drenching enemy gunpits with gas shells. 
Throughout the conflict what the French troops christened Mademoiselle soixante-quinze 
(‘Miss Seventy-Five’) remained indispensable. The 75mms fired some 200 million 
projectiles: today as trophies for collectors, thousands of those shells remain interred.
223
  
Theoretical approaches to the arms race phenomenon centre on technological dynamism, on 
pressures from domestic ‘military-industrial complexes’, and on escalatory ‘action-reaction’ 
spirals of inter-state tension.
224
 In its culminating phase in 1910-14, the pre-war European 
land arms race was primarily a competition for manpower and for military readiness rather 
than for new technology.
225
 But during the preceding decade quick-firing had transformed the 
European artilleries, and to re-equip the armies with quick-firers and their ammunition 
necessitated unprecedented resort to private enterprise. Moreover, firms such as Krupp and 
Schneider became the vehicles by which the recoil-absorption system was disseminated to the 
Low Countries, to the Balkans, and outside Europe. French officials allowed Deport and 
Schneider to supply a putative enemy – Italy – and Krupp equipped potential German 
antagonists such as Belgium and Russia, the Berlin War Ministry accepting that exports were 
needed to maintain manufacturing capacity.
226
 Like HMS Dreadnought, however, although 
drawing on private industry the 75mm and its counterparts resulted from a command 
technology, developed by state rather than commercial initiative. Moreover, government 
financial stringency played a countervailing role throughout the story: in France, for example,  
with the decision for the plaquette Malandrin, and in Germany where the FK 96 n/A suffered 
from using recycled C96 barrels and the drive to increase shell stocks faltered. Indeed in 
general France had the edge in finance and Germany in manufacturing, although the French 
artillery service was a prestigious arm with a reputation for intellectual distinction, and in the 
early stages the polytechniciens outmatched their Krupp and Ehrhardt rivals.
227
 More 
generally, the artillery race’s fiscal and industrial demands widened the gap between the 
leaders – France, Germany, Britain – and the also-rans. 
Domestic considerations notwithstanding, the quick-firing revolution’s biggest implications 
were for the European military balance. That balance was never simply a Franco-German 
one, and Russia in particular carried weight. All the same, whereas in 1897-1905 artillery 
innovation favoured France and helped deter armed conflict, after 1906 Germany first 
regained the advantage but then again feared losing it. The French brought in the 75mm at a 
critical point, prolonging their qualitative advantage. Their secrecy paid off, and they made a 
leap that other armies resolved as soon as possible to emulate. Russia’s effort to forestall the 
process through the Hague Peace Conference was too tardy. The French understood, 
however, that the new technology would spread and that their advantage might be transient. 
Yet unlike the British with the Dreadnought they failed to consolidate and extend their lead,
 
228
 and in the second phase of the quick-firing revolution the advantage passed to Germany, 
which applied the new technology to howitzers and heavy field weapons. The Germans 
hedged their bets rather than staking all on the light field gun, and gave more thought to 
wartime shell production, anticipating more contingencies and better preparing for the 
conflict that actually occurred. They did so partly because their equipment matched better 
with their longstanding offensive war plans, whereas the French switched belatedly from a 
counter-stroke strategy to one of precipitate all-out attack. Having first expanded 75mm 
provision in order to maintain the numerical balance with the FK 96 n/A, the French resolved 
in principle to build howitzers and heavy field weapons but then failed to do so. In fact the 
development cycle for a new generation of French quick-firing heavy guns was not 
particularly slow, but the Germans still pre-empted it. Indeed, the artillery record confirms 
the indications that by 1914 Germany’s leaders perceived a fast receding opportunity for 
victory, although the evidence from munitions stockpiling does not suggest that they 
premeditated hostilities. Nonetheless, the quick-firing revolution’s influence was pervasive. 
To incorporate its story is essential to a fuller understanding not only of the conduct of the 
First World War but also of its outbreak.                                                                                                                                                                                    
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